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US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa
DAN HENK

From Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 92-107.

The novelty of the post-Cold War strategic environment is reflected in the changing jargon of American military
professionals. "Humanitarian assistance" and "peace operations" were hardly key concerns of the national military
establishment in the mid-1980s, though they have become prominent a decade later. Since the early 1990s, US
professional military literature has been increasingly preoccupied, some would say obsessed, with discussions of what
are identified as unprecedented roles for the national military establishment.
Interventions with military forces often figure in discussions of US involvement in Africa; indeed, in the 1990s no part
of the world has seen a greater number of such interventions than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, noncombatant
evacuations, humanitarian relief operations, and peace support interventions tend to obscure the more enduring and
more significant diplomatic and economic links between the United States and African countries. They also obscure
routine military-to-military relations in the region, which have expanded in the wake of the Cold War.
The United States conducts military operations in Africa, just as it exercises diplomacy and provides aid, to further US
regional objectives. The demise of the Cold War had an obvious effect on US objectives in Africa, and while each US
administration is expected to put its own imprint on the nation's foreign policy, some American activities reflect
enduring interests. This article identifies a set of desirable conditions that appear to have become de facto US national
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Identification of US Interests
All nations have interests, and national leaders pursue those interests with varying degrees of coherence and success.
This subject has been treated in depth often enough that it needs little elaboration here.[1] It is relevant, however, to
recall that military options constitute only some of those available when developing foreign policy. Policymakers
assign roles to each policy instrument--diplomatic, economic, informational, and military--commensurate with its
capability and relevance; sometimes the military instrument has been of primary importance, at other times, it has been
marginal, if not irrelevant.[2]
The instruments used in the conduct of foreign policy are simply means to an end, the end in this case being the
advancement of national interests. The effectiveness of a specific instrument, such as military power, can be evaluated
only in the context of the ways in which it might be applied to attain the desired end. Such evaluations are neither easy
nor straightforward, particularly in US relations with underdeveloped regions of the world, and most particularly in
regard to Africa.
Theoretical treatments of the subject often assume that national interests can be identified with precision, and that there
is broad agreement on their content. From that it follows, for some, that national interests are evident to national
policymakers, who then have access to a full range of instruments of national power and can be relatively
unconstrained in pursuing those interests. According to this view, policymakers follow a rational procedure to craft
national security strategies using the appropriate mechanisms and tools of national power. None of these assumptions
is true of US relations with Africa.
The US Constitution unambiguously confers on the executive branch the preponderance of responsibility for managing
foreign relations, but Americans have never endowed their presidency with the exclusive prerogative to identify
national interests. Nor have US administrations ever enjoyed an entirely free hand in developing and implementing
foreign policy.[3] At times, public opinion or Congress has severely constrained an administration's options, sometimes

to the extent of forcing its hand.[4]
Americans do not necessarily agree among themselves on US national interests, in Africa or anywhere else. The
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 has required administrations to publish annually a
National Security Strategy which (presumably) identifies those interests. But that document is more a starting point for
debate than a final word on interests or policy. And although the current Administration has specified regional interests
for executive branch agencies,[5] it has resisted doing so via the more widely disseminated National Security
Strategy.[6]
Various groups inside and outside of government debate what is or is not in the national interest in Africa and
elsewhere in the world.[7] The debate turns on a variety of axes, some of which are ideological: conservatives tend to
be minimalists, liberals maximalists in specifying interests in the developing world. Other axes are cultural, reflecting
the values of academic and ethnic communities.[8] Still others reflect the values of the business community,
humanitarian organizations, and religious or other groups. Many voices compete for the right to define US interests in
Africa, and they are by no means in harmony.
Nor is it easier to prioritize the interests once they are identified. Academic treatments characteristically identify
intensities of interests as, for instance, "survival," "vital," "important," or "peripheral."[9] The Clinton Administration
has added "humanitarian" interests; like all such classifications, this one is subjective and contextual. Because
articulation of interests is hardly an exact science, it is sufficient to acknowledge a basic interest without an
accompanying effort to prioritize intensities. "Intensities," of course, reflect the need to build constituencies for budget
debates.

Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa

So what are US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa? Certainly the annual National Security Strategy (NSS) provides an
administration's perspective on interests, but it never gets around to listing them as such. The 1997 version suggests
that they include attenuation of regional conflict, the growth of democratic institutions and regard for human rights,
sustainable economic development, and security from weapons of mass destruction and transnational threats.[10] By
contrast, a 1995 Department of Defense document bluntly declares that the United States has "very little traditional
strategic interest in Africa,"[11] a remarkable assertion in light of the fact that the United States has intervened in the
region with military forces more than a dozen times since 1990.[12]
Minimalists may argue that the United States has no vital interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and only two important
interests: regional stability and access. By contrast, one author has recently argued that safety from "hot-zone diseases"
such as ebola is a vital national interest, equivalent in importance to safety from attack by weapons of mass
destruction.[13] Likewise, whether or not the discussion is specifically tied to Africa, many Americans would agree
that safety from transnational threats such as terrorism and the importation of illegal narcotics is an important national
interest.
US foreign policy in Africa is unsteady and reactive, allowing events and crises to drive policy.[14] US administrations
struggle with Africa policy because of the inconsistent attention paid to the continent by senior policymakers and their

reluctance to consult regularly with a broad range of African leaders. One result is a failure to clarify regional interests
and establish a broad national consensus on the ways and means to secure them. This failure, in turn, compromises the
focus, sophistication, and potential for success of efforts to secure US regional interests. US policymakers have not
been able to develop a coherent national security strategy for the region, one that clearly identifies regional interests
and then specifies appropriate ways and means to secure them. As a result, regional use of the instruments of US
power--such as diplomacy, military assistance, and economic aid--often is not well coordinated. That said, continuing
US activities in the region suggest that Americans agree that there are interests worth pursuing in Africa, whether or
not the interests are articulated in any official medium, and even if commitment to these interests is sometimes
transient and media-driven.[15]
A test with two criteria can help to identify a regional interest. The first criterion is that the United States has
committed or is likely to commit significant public-sector resources to advance or protect it; the second is that it is a
major foreign policy end in itself, not simply a contributor to a larger objective. Such interests should be relatively
long-term and enduring, and they should transcend the ideological perspectives of individual administrations. The list
below would seem to meet these two criteria; like all such lists, it is subjective. All entries are interrelated and at least
somewhat codependent. Each is discussed in the article:

. Regional stability
. US access to key persons, institutions, facilities, and economic opportunity
. Information and warning
. Safety of American citizens
. Region free of weapons of mass destruction
. Region free of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats
. Regional comity and cooperation
. Freedom from egregious suffering
. Regional governance that is humane, managerially competent, and accountable
. Sustained economic development
. Unthreatened natural environment
Regional Stability
"Stability" could be defined in several different ways; here it has the narrow sense of the absence of significant
interstate or intrastate violence. Manifestations of instability include conflict between warlords in "failed states"
(Liberia or Somalia during the 1990s); violent border disputes; interstate aggression (such as that committed by South
Africa against its neighbors during the apartheid era or by Libya against Chad in the mid-1980s); civil wars (in
Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sudan); insurgencies (such as that in Rwanda or those currently conducted by
Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali); large-scale banditry; oppressive regimes (like Nigeria in the 1990s); and other
unsettled or violent circumstances which provoke large-scale flows of refugees.
State or subregional violence is a symptom of more fundamental problems, often traceable to inequitable access to the
benefits of the state, dire poverty, weak civil societies, unrestrained ambitions of opportunists, lack of transparency and
accountability in governance, and ready availability of arms. While interventions by external actors often can halt
immediate outbreaks of violence, enduring stability requires the reduction or elimination of the problems that create
the conditions for violence.
Instability in Africa has recently produced private "security firms" that offer to national leaders what once were
considered to be mercenaries--military professionals with services for hire. Such services are equally available to duly
constituted, democratic governments and to dictatorial autocrats and warlords. The United States tends to see private

security firms as an obstacle to regional stability.[16]
Regional stability also is threatened by the ready availability of conventional arms. Many are left over from Cold War
proxy conflicts and decolonization struggles. However, the international "black" or "gray" arms markets--in which
unscrupulous entrepreneurs provide arms to any buyer--have serviced African customers such as Angola's Jonas
Savimbi, and have contributed to continuing instability elsewhere in the region. Such arms transfers are very difficult
to monitor and almost impossible to prevent.
Virtually all US regional interests are threatened by breakdowns in regional or subregional stability. And the United
States has pursued its interest in regional stability with diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. So it could be
argued that stability is the basic US interest in Africa, and that protection of all of the other interests depends on this
one.
US access to key persons, institutions, facilities, and economic opportunity
Access, which has several dimensions, is an important US interest in Africa. It can include occasional military use of
African ports, airfields, and other infrastructure for contingency operations in Africa or elsewhere in the world. In this
instance, access encompasses unimpeded use of the sea lines of communication around the continent. Another
dimension is access to African political decisionmakers, which enhances the ability of US diplomats to communicate
regularly with African government officials on matters of interest to the United States.[17]
Still another dimension is economic access, involving the ability of US commercial enterprises to enter African
markets, participate in African economic development, and compete for fair profit. African mineral and oil resources
are also of interest. The real issue here is access to local and regional economic decisionmakers, whether in
government and business communities or as consumers of goods and services. Openness of African media to messages
from the United States is important if we are to influence African political and economic choices.
Access includes the ability of American private-sector groups, such as scholars and humanitarian organizations, to
establish relations with individual Africans and indigenous institutions.[18] It also involves the ability of American
citizens to enjoy firsthand exposure to Africa's rich natural and cultural environments.
Access should be inherent in relations between countries that share important cultural ties and common goals. It allows
for informational exchanges that help assuage normal suspicions and tensions. No country's interests will be identical
to those of another, and mutual access facilitates resolution of disagreements over divergent interests.
Much of the access which Americans enjoy in Africa is not controlled in any organized way by the US government.
However, continuing US diplomatic engagement is an important factor in promoting both private and public sector
access. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced its regional diplomatic presence, sending an
unfortunate signal to Africans.
Information and Warning
Though related to access, another distinct US interest is that of obtaining timely, reliable information about African
issues, trends, events, and personalities. Information and reliable local sources for it are particularly important when
there is a likelihood that we could become involved in an expensive humanitarian operation or military intervention.
Commercial opportunities and American concerns for the planetary environment also can be developed to mutual
advantage only if US policymakers have timely and reliable information about local conditions.
One of the reasons why this is a salient interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is the difficulty in obtaining such information.
The problem is compounded by authoritarian regimes which thrive on secrecy, by communications difficulties in
Africa, by the limited US intelligence focus on the region, by the often sporadic media attention to events in Africa,
and even by cultural differences between African and US interlocutors.
Absence of timely and reliable information can lead to humanitarian tragedies which might otherwise be moderated or
averted if recognized in their early stages of development. It could lead to lethally slow responses to such transnational

threats as terrorism, narco-trafficking, and pandemic disease. It also puts US policymakers at risk of manipulation by
foreign groups, foreign leaders, and even by the nongovernmental humanitarian organizations that respond to
humanitarian crises.[19]
American embassies are a primary source of regional information for national policymakers. Reduction of the US
diplomatic presence undermines US ability to secure this interest.
Safety of American Citizens
It hardly needs to be said that the United States will expend enormous effort to protect or evacuate American citizens
from conditions of escalating disorder. The Clinton Administration has even characterized the safety of American
citizens as a vital national interest.[20]
In the mid-1990s, security threats to US citizens in Africa generally are caused by instability, poverty, and related
violence, not by deliberate efforts of parties in the region to victimize Americans. The United States has employed its
military forces to conduct eight evacuations of noncombatants from African countries since 1990.[21]
Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The term "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) refers to nuclear, chemical, or biological agents designed to kill or
incapacitate human populations, or to render livestock, crops, and water unfit for human consumption. Almost by
definition, but reinforced by recollections of the nuclear terror of the Cold War, nonproliferation of such weapons is a
vital national interest. The Clinton Administration unambiguously asserts that "weapons of mass destruction pose the
greatest potential threat to global security."[22] Not surprisingly, the Administration has strongly promoted, in Africa
as elsewhere, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a significant venue for development or deployment of weapons of mass destruction.
Save for South Africa, no country in the region is known to have possessed nuclear weapons, or even to have indicated
a serious desire to possess them.[23] Only a handful of Sub-Saharan African countries are known to have chemical
weapons. No country in the region is known to have a current interest in the development of biological weapons.
Unfortunately, technology at the end of the 20th century is sufficiently advanced that some forms of WMD could be
developed surreptitiously and relatively rapidly anywhere in the world. Such weapons may be attractive to future
leaders of rogue states, including those that might emerge in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most remote areas of the world
probably also provide the best protection against discovery, and could thus be attractive to outside terrorist groups or
criminal organizations willing to pay for locations for covert laboratories.
Africa also could be the venue for the development of natural WMD. As one of the world's "hot-zones," Central Africa
seems to have been the origin of several virulent diseases, particularly hemorrhagic fevers, with the potential to
develop into pandemics of tremendous lethality. Such diseases pose a threat not only to residents of the region, but to
the world beyond the continent as well. At the end of the 20th century, any disease is but a plane ride away from the
population centers of the world.[24]
Region Free of Sponsors or Safe Havens for Transnational Threats
The United States has a distinct interest in ensuring that no African country sponsor or harbor the perpetrators of any
of a range of transnational threats. Several threats in this category are not anchored in any one country; ideas and
actors cross national borders with relative impunity. Transnational threats are created by the activities of international
crime syndicates, including those that move illegal drugs and launder the proceeds, operations by international terrorist
groups, activities of international "con artists," perpetrators of banking scams, and depredations against civil discourse
by technologically sophisticated vandals.[25] It is another of the paradoxes of technological achievement that our
increasingly computerized world is increasingly at the mercy of highwaymen on the information superhighway.[26]
It is very much in the US national interest that African governments participate as partners in the worldwide struggle
against such threats. It also is in the US national interest that African law-enforcement institutions have the resources

and encouragement to do so within the region and as partners with the rest of the global community.
The United States maintains relations with African law enforcement agencies, participating with them in international
organizations such as Interpol and in various bilateral programs. One serious constraint to better cooperation is the fact
that US law severely limits our ability to provide law enforcement training to foreign military or police personnel.[27]
In the mid-1980s, the Department of Justice adapted an innovative Western Hemisphere program, the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and through it offered training to the African countries of
Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. And, beginning in the early 1990s, both the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI
have maintained regional contacts designed to combat transnational threats.
Regional Comity and Cooperation
It is a significant US national interest that African countries engage in peaceful diplomatic and economic activity and
participate as willing and capable partners with the United States in a wide variety of activities in Africa and
elsewhere, to alleviate complex humanitarian emergencies, promote regional economic development, and fight
transnational threats. The absence of comity and cooperation from Sub-Saharan Africa poses a significant barrier to
pursuit of virtually all these US interests.
Comity and cooperation among African countries themselves also is a US national interest, contributing directly to
economic development and regional stability. This interest is promoted by subregional economic organizations, such
as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). This interest, which is difficult to advance for a variety of reasons, requires considerable, consistent effort. It
is always important and could be of particular significance to the United States in dealing with regional or worldwide
crises.
Freedom from Egregious Suffering
One of the inevitable results of the information age is rapid access by the media, and thus by the American public, to
information about human tragedy everywhere in the world. Whether at home or abroad, profound human suffering
affronts basic American values and almost inevitably provokes a public response, including calls for the government to
intervene. Though responses to such circumstances sometimes are superficial, inconsistent, or short-lived, they reflect
a basic American belief that "we are our brother's keeper."[28]
US foreign policy has focused on encouraging respect for human rights and ending human rights abuses. The United
States has exercised diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to further this
interest, particularly in Africa.
Much of the suffering encountered in Africa results less from malice than from naturally occurring threats such as
drought and disease. Hazards from the environment sometimes are compounded by inept or uncaring national
authorities, by the overwhelming scale of the problems, and by the all-too-obvious austerity of infrastructure in many
African countries. Again, the United States has committed resources to address all of these problems. For example, an
extraordinary (and little known) drought relief effort in 1991 and 1992 coordinated by the US Agency for International
Development helped to prevent widespread starvation in southern Africa.
While freedom from egregious suffering is strongly anchored in American values, protection of this interest is a
prerequisite to others, including regional stability and safety of American citizens.[29]
Regional Governance that is Humane, Managerially Competent, and Accountable
Some Americans, including policymakers in the current Administration, strongly believe that the United States should
promote a more-or-less Western model of participatory democracy throughout the world.[30] This indicates a
presumption that democratic institutions tend to protect human rights and that democracies are less likely to resort to
conflict as a way to solve their foreign and domestic problems. It also is based on the view expressed in the 1997
National Security Strategy that "democracies have proved more peaceful, stable, and reliable partners and more likely
to pursue sound economic policies."[31]

While Americans debate the propriety of advocating specific forms of governance for other countries, it is in the
interest of the United States that African governments share respect for human rights, the rule of law, informed
management of infrastructure and resources, and accountability of government to the society being served.[32] An
important part of this ideal of governance is the belief that national security services, particularly the military
establishments, should be under the firm control of civilian authorities. These interests support others, including
regional stability, economic development, and freedom from egregious suffering. Since the early 1990s, US policy in
Africa has emphasized the so-called "three Ds" regarding regional militaries: downsize, demobilize, and democratize.
This policy has been supported with modest security assistance funding.
In this decade, Africa has seen some movement toward governmental transparency and accountability, although few
African countries have the mature civil societies and political institutions that sustain these features in developed
Western countries. One interesting phenomenon is the emergence of leaders such as Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and
Yowery Museveni of Uganda, who, though not committed democrats in the Western model, have a vision and strong
commitment to practical regional development.[33]
Sustained Economic Development
There is little disagreement that many of Africa's problems derive from poverty and inequitable access to the limited
goods and benefits of African states. Ironically, many African countries (including some of those most wracked by
internal tensions) are rich in natural resources. Even superficial analysis leads to the conclusion that significant
economic progress could moderate many of the region's most profound problems, including those that bear heavily on
various US regional interests. The 1997 National Security Strategy establishes US interest in "a stable, economically
dynamic Africa," and lists a variety of activities undertaken by the United States to pursue this interest.[34] The same
document calls attention to the potential of Sub-Saharan Africa as a largely untapped market for US products. The
clear implication is that economic development in Africa would bear tangibly and directly on US economic well-being
as well as its own.
Unthreatened Natural Environment
Unfortunately, economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa could conflict with another US interest, that of an
unthreatened natural environment. Uncontrolled development that results in widespread environmental degradation is
neither in Africa's long-term best interest nor that of the rest of the world. Because of the intense internal and external
pressures for rapid improvement of economic conditions and the heavy dependence of some African countries on
extractive industries, regional decisionmakers may encounter almost irresistible pressure to downplay the importance
of protecting the environment in national development strategies. The pall of airborne industrial effluents over
Lubumbashi (Congo) or parts of the Rand (in South Africa) bear visible testimony to the competition between
economic development and preservation of the natural environment.
Africa's environment faces many threats at the end of the 20th century, a situation that is also true of other parts of the
developing world. Rain forests are threatened by uncontrolled development and harvesting, other woodlands by
increasing demands for fuel. Rapidly growing populations of humans and livestock stress already fragile ecologies,
resulting in unwise cultivation of marginal soils and overgrazing of fragile savanna lands. Many areas in Africa are
subject to recurring drought, periodic flooding, endemic human or livestock diseases, and other naturally occurring
threats. Urbanization and increasing human populations have contaminated already inadequate water sources.
Industrial waste and urban effluents often are discharged into the atmosphere, soil, or rivers without apparent regard
for the effects of toxic materials on humans, plants, or animals. Increasing human populations result in declining
habitats for wild animals and plant life, which can adversely affect biodiversity. Former US Assistant Secretary of
State Chester Crocker, among others, has called attention to the "interplay between Africa's demographic, climatic,
geological and conflict trends." He argues that this interplay requires serious research and that resolution demands US
interest and leadership. He also notes that US health and well-being are at stake in these "African" issues.[35]
Many of the threats to Africa's natural environment do not originate in Africa. Irresponsible overfishing by commercial
fleets from Europe and Asia may have permanently damaged the once lucrative fishing grounds off much of the
African coast. Some African governments have been willing to allow disposal in their countries of highly toxic wastes

as a result of bribes from unscrupulous corporations in the developed countries. Asian cartels willingly pay vast sums
of money to African poachers for rhinoceros horn, resulting in the likely extinction of that animal in the African wild.
Africa still has a magnificent natural environment which is an invaluable global heritage; its preservation is important
to long-term, sustainable economic development in Africa. African biodiversity is important to world scientific
research, possibly holding the keys to treatments for some human diseases. Stability of African flora may be important
to regional, and possibly worldwide, weather patterns. It is very much in the interest of the developed world to foster
responsible stewardship of the African natural environment.[36] The United States has pursued this interest through
bilateral diplomatic efforts and in multinational fora. Some US aid to African countries has been targeted at
environmental objectives.
The African Crisis Response Initiative
A recent example of the limited and reactive character of US involvement in Africa is the African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI). The idea of supporting an indigenous African crisis response capability originated with Assistant
Secretary of State Herman J. Cohen in the early 1990s, but it took specific form in 1996 as a Clinton Administration
response to a looming crisis in the small central African nation of Burundi. The 1996 proposal envisioned a multination African peacekeeping force supported by the United States and other developed world donors.
With little advance warning to Africans or to US diplomatic missions, the Administration used an October 1996
regional visit by then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher to announce the initiative and solicit African participation.
The response, predictably, was tepid. America's European allies already were active in efforts to develop African
capabilities for conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Africans were puzzled (in some cases annoyed) by the lack of
prior consultation, by US failure to recognize the growing role in conflict resolution of subregional organizations (like
ECOWAS and SADC), by the lack of definition in the proposal, and by its obvious appearance as an eleventh-hour
response to an ongoing regional crisis.
Despite the lukewarm African response, the Administration continued to work on the idea, appointing a senior Foreign
Service officer to head an Interagency Working Group. By mid-1997, this had resulted in multilateral agreements with
the United Kingdom, France, other European donors, and Japan. The Interagency Working Group also crafted an
important relationship between the ACRI concept and the United Nations. As this is written, the United States had
obtained commitments from seven African countries for a total of eight battalions,[37] whose training, begun by US
Special Forces in late summer 1997, emphasized communications, logistics, and leadership.
Africans remain ambivalent about the ACRI; some regard it as a patronizing attempt by outsiders to define Africa's
problems and to dictate solutions to them.[38] Some see a hidden US agenda. Others doubt the promises of support,
while still others find in it an effort to shift the "world's dirty work" onto the backs of Africans. The US initiative does
not define how Africans might structure or use the ACRI-trained units. Until those and similar issues are resolved,
ACRI will continue to be a tough sell in Africa.
Observations
The United States does have interests in Africa, a fact clearly demonstrated by our commitment of resources and our
exercise in the region of the various instruments of national power. There is, of course, some danger in treating those
interests as if each one of them is both necessary and sufficient to meet US policy objectives. Progress on any of them
almost inevitably requires sophisticated approaches that can address many of them simultaneously. And while
Americans disagree among themselves on the exact nature and intensity of interests in Africa, and on the acceptable
costs for securing them, it is nevertheless possible to identify a list of regional interests which most informed citizens
could endorse.
What the United States does not have is a clear vision at the national level of how to use the available ways and means
to attain the strategic objectives reflected in those interests. As a result, some of the most visible involvements (notably
the commitment of military forces for noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian relief operations, and peace support)
seem to be hasty reactions to events over which the United States has little control. When policy serves mainly to react
to events rather than actively seeking to shape them, one must look to national security strategy objectives to discover

the reasons for our inability to anticipate crises.
The appearance of floundering in Africa policy is exacerbated by a puzzling failure of senior US policymakers to
consult regularly with African leaders. When US leaders propose a major shift in regional policy, it sometimes seems
to be a unilateral US decision with inadequate consideration of the sensitivities of allies or partners, as was clearly the
case with the African Crisis Response Initiative. It is true that Africa has never been, and may never be, at the center
of US foreign policy concerns. Nor will the United States likely devote substantially more resources than it now does
in pursuit of its regional interests. That's all the more reason for US policy to be well informed, subtle, and dependent
on close cooperation with regional partners. Africans currently are looking to the United States for that kind of
leadership.
The appearance of incoherence and inconsistency in US policy masks some very productive, long-term relationships
between the United States and many African countries. These relationships--political, economic, and military--have
generally improved in the wake of the Cold War, and they protect US interests in Africa reasonably well. However,
they are not indicative of truly visionary efforts to shape the security environment in the region. US policy would
benefit from a clearer definition of interests, a national debate on interests and costs, and a well-thought-out national
security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.
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